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'The impending demise of Nigeria's forthcoming
Third Republic' was the title of an article by a Nige-
rian scholar published a year or two before the
military government was due to hand over to an
elected civilian administration (Agbese 1990). Sel-
dom have a social scientist's predictions been so
rapidly fulfilled, General Babangida aborting the
Third Republic before it began by declaring the
1993 Presidential elections invalid. For in Nigeria,
as in most other African countries, the military
establishment and other repressive apparatuses of
the state continue to be the single most important
obstacle to transition to democracy. Even in retreat,
they are formidably equipped to block political re-
form; to re-intervene to reverse it, as in Nigeria; to
dictate the terms and conditions under which the
return to con-stitutional government takes place; or
(where the military itself falls apart as in Somalia or
Liberia) to swamp democratization in a tide of armed
conflict between warring factions.
This article focuses on some of the political and
policy problems associated with efforts to bring the
military under democratic control. It starts with
an appraisal of the democratic transitions now oc-
curring in Africa: how widespread are they, how
likely are they to take root and what different his-
torical routes have they taken? It argues that in a
number of states, perhaps the majority, the door to
democracy was opened, not by donor pressures or
by the policy choices of military and political élites,
but through 'demilitarization by default', i.e. mili-
tary reductions forced by economic decline and the
withdrawal of foreign military support after the end
of the Cold War; which weakened the resolve and
capacity of authoritarian regimes to stay in power
when faced by popular resistance. This in turn
raises a series of policy dilemmas for supporters of
democracy in Africa and among donors endeavour-
ing to tame military establishments and ensure their
respect for the rules of the democratic political game,
examined in the final section of the article.
l The author would like to thank the US Institute of Peace for
funding the research on which this article is partly based
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2 INCOMPLETE DEMOCRATIZATION
At the outset of the 1990s it seemed that the wave of
democratization that had swept across other parts
of the developing world had begun to break over
Africa. Contested multi-party elections either had
been held or were soon to take place in more than
half the countries of the continent, and there were
stirrings of political change in many others. At last,
it appeared, authoritarian governance and military
dominance in politics might be on the way out. The
optimism that prevailed has to an extent been
justified, as can be seen in Table 1. In addition to
three already established democracies in Botswana,
Mauritius and Senegal (a fourth, in Gambia was
overthrown by a military coup in 1994), a dozen
others can now be considered fledgling democra-
cies, with varying prospects of consolidation; and
there are at least eight or so more where real
advances toward political liberalization are afoot.
Yet more careful analysis permits only qualified
optimism. To start with, major doubts surround the
extent and prospects of democracy in the countries
considered to have made a transition. Zambia, for
instance, remains ebulliently, almost chaotically,
democratic; but can hardly be considered stable
whilst it is passing through the traumas of economic
adjustment. Niger, Mali and the Congo continue to
be plagued by military indiscipline, civil unrest and
economic recession. Their classification as partly
consolidated 'democracies', rather than countries
where democratic initiatives are coopted or
blocked, is still a matter for history to decide. For
the imposition of fairly arbitrary political cate-
gories (as in Table 1) on fluid and uncertain political
situations, though broadly defensible, still leaves
plenty of room for dispute about whether indi-
vidual African states belong to one group rather
than another, or more than one at a time2
Moreover, in several more countries democratic
reform processes have been coopted by existing rul-
ing elites; one can at best talk of 'facade' democracy
2 For instance, Ghana's 1992 constitution and elections are
regarded by some as originating a transition to democracy, but by
others as merely providing cosmetic 'democratic' legitimation to
the existing PNDC (now NDC) regime.
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TABLE 1. THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA AS OF LATE 1994
DEMOCRACIES IN PROCESS OF CONSOLIDATION
(I) Established but Limited Democracies
Botswana Senegal
Mauritius
(ii) More Recently Instituted Democracies
Civilian Since Independence Previously Mi/italy-Ruled
Cape Verde S.Tomó and Principe Benin () Madagascar
Malawi South Africa Central African Republic () Mali
Namibia Zambia Congo Niger
COUNTRIES ENJOYING 'DEMOCRACY IN PARTS'
(i) Still Making Advances Toward Democracy
Civilian Since Independence Previously Mi/italy-Ruled
Eritrea Tanzania Ethiopia Lesotho(*)
Mozambique Zimbabwe Ghana () Uganda (*)
Seychelles
(ii) 'Democratic' Institutions Coopted by Existing Ruling Elite
Civilian Since Independence Previously Mi/italy-Ruled
Cameroon Guinea-Bissau Egypt
Comoros Kenya Guinea
Côte d'ivoire Morocco Mauritania
Djibouti Swaziland
Gabon Tunisia
COUNTRIES WHERE DEMOCRATIZATION HAS BEEN STALLED OR REVERSED
(j) Stalled or Reversed by Existing Authoritarian Regime
Civilian Since Independence Formerly or at Present Mi/italy-Ruled
Algeria (2) Chad (*) (2) Libya Sudan (*) (2)
Burkina Faso (*) Equatorial Guinea Nigeria (*) Togo
Burundi (2) Gambia Sierra Leone (*) (2) Zaire
(ii) Stalled or Reversed by War/Armed Conflict
Cívilían Since Independence Formerly or at Present Military Ruled
Angola Liberia Somalia
W. Sahara (1) Rwanda
Notes:
(*) Countries where previous returns to constitutional or democratic government have been thwarted.
(1) Not yet independent.
(2) In Algeria, Chad, Sierra Leone and Sudan democracy is blocked both by military regimes and by armed conflict;
in Burundi by conflict and a political stalemate between an elected regime and the armed forces.
Source: The starting point for the categorizations in the Table is the democracy scores given African political
systems by the African Governance Program of the Carter Centre (CC) (Africa Demos (1994): 27), updated
and extended by the author. 'Democracies in Process of Consolidation' include all the African politics
considered by the CC to be 'Democratic' (democracy scores of 6 or more). Countries Enjoying Democracy in
Parts include both the countries the CC considers 'Directed Democracies' (Cameroon, Egypt, Morocco) and
transitional regimes with a 'Moderate' commitment to democracy (democracy scores 4-5) 'Countries Where
Democratization has been Stalled or Reversed' include both the countries considered by the CC as
Ambiguous' in their commitment to democracy (democracy scores 2-4) or where there is 'Contested
Sovereignty' (i.e. civil war). The distinctions within each of these broad headings (e.g. between countries where
there are established or more recently instituted democracies; or between those that do and do not have
experience of military government) are the author's own.
in countries like Cameroon, the Cote d'Ivoire,
Guinea or Kenya. In others, moves toward demo-
cracy have been deliberately subverted, as in Togo
or Zaire, or they have been nipped in the bud by
authoritarian regimes unable or unwilling to trans-
fer power to elected civilians, as in Algeria or
Nigeria. Finally, there are the countries in which not
only democratization, but the very existence of a
functioning national state is imperilled by war or
civil conflict, as in Somalia, Liberia or Rwanda; an
increasingly common condition as government ar-
mies have begun to lose their monopolies of violence
in the context of a generalised retreat from the state.
A glance at Table 1 permits three further observa-
tions. First, more than half the countries making
progress toward democratic rule were previously
ruled by civilian autocracies. For in Africa unlike
some other parts of the South, authoritarian govern-
ment has not been coextensive solely with military
government. Second, before the present wave of
democratizations a number of countries had made
earlier transitions from military to constitutional
rule; but in almost all cases the military had re-
intervened3. Third, the great majority of states where
democratization has been stalled or reversed, are
now or were in the past ruled by military regimes;
but this may in part be because civilian autocrats
have been more adept at concealing the substance
of power under the capacious cloak of formally
'democratic' institutions.
3 DIFFERENT ROUTES TO DEMOCRACY
Behind the apparently uniform trend of democrati-
zation, African states have been following greatly
varying routes to democracy, shaped by their indi-
vidual historical circumstances. Broadly speaking,
one may distinguish six main scenarios, each with
its own distinctive implications for military roles
in the transition.
1 Reform by modifying previous constitutional
arrangements, so as to create the conditions under
which freely contested multi-party elections can be
held. The majority of the regimes initiating this
kind of transition have been civilian autocracies. So
far the cases in which it has produced actual changes
in government, as in Zambia and Malawi, have
been relatively rare. More often the polity has been
liberalized under the existing leadership, as in
Before the 1992 coup, Sierra Leone was the sole exception;
however, the displaced civilian government was not a democracy.
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Senegal; or regime-led reform has led to massaged
elections and reinstitutionalization of autocracy in a
democratic shell (i.e. democradura or façade demo-
cracy) in countries like Kenya, Cameroon, Côte
d'Ivoire or Gabon. Military and security establish-
ments have seldom been directly involved in these
transitions; but their willingness to back them has
been crucial for their success.
2 Planned or pacted military extrication from
power, often over long periods, by authoritarian
regimes negotiating new constitutional dispensa-
tions with chosen civilian interlocutors. Normally
such pacts have been designed to protect outgoing
power-holders from retribution for abuses of power,
to preserve military interests, and to shape the
political character of the transitions. In Africa, they
have most often been negotiated by governments
of military origin in English-speaking countries,
like Ghana, Nigeria and (during earlier efforts to
introduce democracy) Sudan.
The main drawback of pacted military withdrawal,
is that constitutional prohibitions cannot stop mili-
tary reintervention, of the kind that reversed earlier
transitions in all three of the above countries, and
aborted Nigeria's latest attempt after the annulled
1993 presidential elections. Military reintervention
has in effect become institutionalized, alternating
with 'returns to civilian rule' as the prevailing method
of regime change; and the armed forces have be-
come de facto political parties (Rouquié 1981). A
more recent trend, however, has been for regimes of
military origin to pact transitions in such a way as
to reinvent their own rule in a 'democratic' form, in
theory competing with civilian politicians, rather
than departing from the political scene as in earlier
transitions: the returns to constitutional demo-
cracy in Ghana and Guinea are recent examples, in
both cases raising serious questions about whether
a genuine transition has occurred (being in this
respect little different from the democraduras of
civilian origin).
3 Seizure of the political initiative by political and
social forces acting outside the state, mobilizing
civil society, forcing out the military and producing
new constitutional dispensations (as through 'Na-
tional Conferences' in Francophone countries like
Benin, Congo, etc.). The major difficulty associated
with this route has been its tendency to weaken
already weak states, making it difficult for the
democratic successor regimes to govern effectively
or respect democratic rights (in both Niger and
Mali, for example conflicts with minorities have
greatly complicated the task of consolidating de-
mocracy). Moreover in other countries, existing
regimes have profited from opposition divisions to
block popular initiatives, subvert the constitution,
stay in power and perpetuate repressive govern-
ance, with scarcely any concessions to democracy,
as in Togo, Chad or Zaire.
4 Collapse of authoritarian regimes and their
supporting military structures from within, often
after coups by middle-ranking or junior offices or
indeed men in the ranks, ushering in speedy trans-
fers of power to elected politicians, as in Mali (though
triggered by civilian mobilization against a repres-
sive military regime) or in the past, Sudan, Ghana or
Sierra Leone. However, such collapse of military
and authoritarian structures has not always brought
about transitions to democracy. During the 1970s
and early 1980s it was just as likely to be associated
with the advent of 'revolutionary' military regimes
like those of Mengistu in Ethiopia, Rawlings in
Ghana or Sankara in Burkina Faso (Hutchful 1986).
Because of the increasing atrophy and decay of
many African states, a rather different danger has
arisen in the 1990s: namely that military revolts
could tear down entire polities not just regimes,
ushering in civil war and political anarchy, as in
Somalia and Liberia.
5 Military or political defeat of the regime4 though
revolutionary wars or insurrections directed by
political/military mass movements which may
or may not open the way to democracy. The first
generation of revolutionary wars in Algeria,
Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique, installed
one-party states instead. More recent transitions,
however, have introduced political dispertsations
based on democracy either in its liberal form (as in
Ethiopia, Namibia and South Africa), or in some
more controlled variant (as in Zimbabwe, Uganda
and Eritrea).
6 Democracy negotiated as part of the settlement
of long-standing armed conflicts, (e.g. in Angola,
Mozambique or Chad). Many of these conflicts have
Relatively few revolutionary wars have culminated with the
actual defeat of the regime (as in Uganda and Ethiopia). More
frequently the regime has been forced into negotiations by a costly
military stalemate: in effect a political victory for the revolution-
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seen the rise of warlords, or military entrepreneurs
with a considerable stake in their accumulated in-
vestments (in combatants and materiel) and in con-
tinued conflict, except when it can be terminated on
terms that yield a profit on their investments. Hence
peace settlements have often involved highly
Faustian bargains with political groups like Renamo
in Mozambique or Unita in Angola, not previously
noted for their respect for human rights and the
niceties of democratic behaviour. In these circum-
stances is all too easy for democracy - and peace - to
become the casualty of disagreements between the
warring parties over the distribution of power and
benefits under the new dispensation. Yet at the
same time no settlement, still less transition to
deomocracy is possible unless the rival military
forces can be integrated and brought under some
form of government control.
These scenarios are little more than useful ways of
summarizing complex historical changes. They are
not policy agendas that can be pursued by state
élites or democracy-promoters in circumstances of
their own choosing. Nevertheless they have often
required difficult policy choices; e.g. by incumbent
regimes to hold free elections that could result in
their loss of power (scenario 1); by military leaders
to 'pact' their own political withdrawal (scenario 2);
by governments to negotiate truces with armed
opponents, so as to permit them to share power or
take part in elections (scenario 6); and by the sup-
porters of democracy to agree to less than complete
transitions, in order to neutralize opposition from
the military or other groups associated with incum-
bent regimes.
4 DEMILITARIZATION BY DEFAULT
Are these moves in the direction of democracy - by
whichever of the above routes - sustainable, or will
they meet the same fate as earlier attempts to
democratize African political systems? A realistic
assessment requires an understanding of the factors
that sustained non-democratic governance in the
past, and still to a significant degree sustain it in
the 1990s. Among the most crucial of the support
structures of oppression have been Africa's military
establishments, police forces, gendarmeries, secret
services, paramilitary units and 'special units' of
ary forces, as in the former Portuguese states, Zimbabwe or South
Africa (Namibia is a slightly different case because the negotia-
tions were also linked to the settlement of the conflict in Angola).
TABLE 2: GROWTH OR DECLINE IN AFRICAN MILITARY SPENDING,
NUMBERS IN ARMED FORCES AND ARMS IMPORTS
(percentage annual changes)
Note: Figures are average annual growth rates in constant (1991) prices for military spending
and arms imports, and for numbers of men in armed forces.
Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers 1991-1992, Washington DC 1994: 2-8.
various descriptions. Not only have they cushioned
authoritarian regimes, be they civilian or military,
from the discontent of their citizens; in the more
than half of the countries that have at some time
been military ruled, they have emerged as political
actors in their own right.
This pre-eminence of the military was partly the
consequence of the political failures of post-colonial
African governments: their deficiencies in economic
management (made worse by external economic
conditions) their corruption and their democratic
deficits (i.e. neglect of the concerns and interests
of the great mass of their citizens). However, the
com-plex process of militarization that gathered
momentum between the 1960s and the early 1980s -
comprising increase of military influence in poli-
tics, military spending, arms imports and armed
conflict, though these different aspects of militari-
zation were not automatically correlated - acquired
a dynamic of its own (Luckham 1985 and 1994).
During the Cold War it was reinforced by Africa's
extensive military ties with foreign powers, from
both the Western and the Communist military blocs.
African governments built up a capacity to coerce
through their arms purchases and through foreign
military aid, credits and training, that bore little
relationship to their capacity to govern, and relieved
them of the need to win the consent of their citizens.
Foreign powers did not necessarily set out deliber-
ately to strengthen authoritarian regimes; but the
latter were at least in some measure a product of
Though probably no more than all forms of government
spending; with some variation from state to state.
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their Cold War rivalries, and of aid policies that
turned a blind eye to how aid and arms buttressed
rapacious and repressive ruling élites. However, it
is now beside the point whether the original sources
of Africa's militarization were 'external' and driven
by a global arms economy and Cold War rivalries,
or whether they followed the 'internal' logic of
African states and their conflicts, as post-Cold War
analyses have tended to argue (Somerville 1993).
The reality is that military influence, repressive
governance and conflict became so deeply internal-
ized in African states and societies, that they are
now far more difficult to eradicate, with or without
outside help, than they were in the years immedi-
ately following independence.
During the past decade this foreign support has
largely evaporated. To all appearances the militari-
zation that it supported has also been thrown into
reverse (Table 2). Arms imports by African states
have declined to a small fraction of their peak in the
early 1980s, from an estimated $7.8 bn in 1981 to $2.1
bn in 1990 and $0.9 bn in 1991 (these are current
price figures, the constant price decline has been
even greater). Military spending has also fallen5,
though by no means as dramatically, with the cuts
distributed very unevenly between individual states
(Tables 3 and 4). The numbers of men serving in
Africa's armed forces only began to decline during
the latter part of the decade (though this decline
was offset by the proliferation of irregular military
formations outside the control of the state). This
has resulted in what (following Ball 1992: 20) one
1981 -91 1987-91 1981-91 1987-91
Military spending -1.1 -3.1 0.1 2.5
Armed forces 1.8 -1.3 0.6 -1.0
Arms imports -18.4 -39.1 -7.2 -21.9
Africa All Developing Countries





e.g. Burkina Faso, Togo,
Kenya, Uganda, Zambia
13 countries including





6 countries including e.g.
Senegal, Algeria,
Côte d'ivoire, Mauritius
Notes: Countnes listed within each category are listed in order of shares of military expenditure in GNP.
Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1994 World Military Expenditures and Arme Transfers;
1991-1992 Washington DC, pp 24 and 39.
may call a 'hollowing' of military structures: such
that roughly the same number of men are main-
tained under arms, but much less is spent to equip,
maintain and pay them.
In the preponderance of cases, this demilitarization
was not the product of deliberate policy choices by
African governments (Nigeria's rationalization of
its armed forces in the late 1970s and Uganda's
current demobilization have been among the rare
exceptions). It began before the process of demo-
cratization got under way, though continuing in
parallel with it. And whilst in some countries it has
been associated with termination of armed conflict,
in others it has not. Instead, there have been two
principle reasons for the decline. First, the large-
scale withdrawal of foreign military support
following the end of the Cold War, having an espe-
cially heavy impact on countries formerly assisted
by the Soviet Union and its allies. Second, the fiscal
and balance of payments difficulties faced by many
African states during the 1980s and 1990s. Put
bluntly, many of them no longer disposed of the tax
revenues, foreign earnings and foreign credits that
would sustain their previous outlays on weapons
and military wages. Yet those that continued to
spend heavily were not necessarily those that could
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afford it: mostly they were countries still embroiled
in armed conflict like Angola, Ethiopia, Mozam-
bique, Rwanda and Sudan (see Tables 3 and 4);
which not only bankrupted their economies, but
also contributed to the collapse or near collapse of
their military structures and states.
Thus military cuts were often part of a broader
picture of development failure and state weakening.
Governments facing protests against their failure
to deliver development, or against structural ad-
justment programmes, no longer disposed of the
resources required to pay off their supporters or buy
military and police protection. Their 'hollowed'
military and security establishments tended to be
immobilized by equipment shortages and falling
real wages (indeed sometimes, as in Zaire, by failure
to pay soldiers wages at all); by the collapse of
systems of command and control; by their involve-
ment in corruption and banditry; and in the more
extreme cases such as Chad, Somalia or Liberia,
by the fragmentation of the armed forces into war-
ring factions. They were often unable to provide
minimum levels of stability and public order; or
even to defeat the irregular forces confronting them
in countries such as Angola, Ethiopia or Mozam-
bique. In sum, the myth of military power was
Share of Military Low-Income Countries Middle-Income Countries
Expenditure to GNP (%) (GNP per capita under $500) (GNP per capita over $500)
6% and over Ethiopia, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Angola,
Rwanda Libya, Sudan
Chad, Liberia, Tanzania Zimbabwe, Botswana,
Morocco, Lesotho
comprehensively undermined, along with that of a
centralized, effective state, though with little as yet
to replace them.
This demilitarization by default at the very least
rendered authoritarian regimes more vulnerable to
pressures to democratize; most directly where mili-
tary governments were compromised by failure, but
also under repressive civilian governments. In some
cases it prepared the ground for the complete col-
lapse of dictatorships, as (in different ways) in So-
malia, Ethiopia or Mali. Yet it does not necessarily
bode well for the consolidation of democracy. For
most of the new democratic regimes face exactly the
same problems of structurally adjusting weak econo-
mies as their authoritarian predecessors. They also
need to regain control over the politicized, demoral-
ized and faction-ridden military establishments
bequeathed to them by authoritarian governance.
In doing so, they must reverse the enduring in-
stitutional legacies of Africa's military decades,
including; (i) the continued determination of many
regimes (probably the majority) and their military
backers to resist efforts to oblige them to cede power
to democratically-elected governments, (ii) the still
present danger of military reintervention after
transitions to democratic rule, or where (as in
Nigeria) they were about to take place, (iii) the
tendency of military and security establishments to
cling to their political and professional privileges,
even under formally democratic governance, (iv)
the widespread survival of habits and practices of
power inherited from authoritarian governance (e.g.
restrictions on liberties and disregard of human
rights; continued deployment of the armed forces to
preserve domestic law and order; undiminished
surveillance by secret services and security bureauc-
racies), (y) organizationally weak and politically
divided military structures, whose possible collapse
could imperil the very existence of the state, (vi)
spreading civil unrest and armed conflict, including
a virtual privatization of violence in the hands of
armed groups beyond the control of the state.
The first four of these legacies relate to overpower-
ful states and military establishments, and might
therefore seem very different from the fifth and
sixth, which are associated with their collapse. In
reality, however, they are different facets of the
same dilemma: that regimes utilizing military force
to crush opposition have ended up demonstrating
the weakness of the repressive structures on which
they depend; all the more when they have failed to
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TABLE 4: SHARE OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT






Burkina Faso 10. Libya
10% to 19.9%
17 States, including e.g. Zaire, Chad, Zimbabwe, Togo, Tanzania, South Africa
5% to 9.9%
13 States, including e.g. Botswana, Kenya, Cameroon, Senegal, Algeria
Less than 5%
8 States, including e.g. Ghana, Côte d'ivoire, Nigeria, Mauritius
Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1994) World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers;
1991-1992 Washington DC, pp24 and 39; countries listed in order of ranking in share of military expenditure in CGE.
generate the economic growth required to pay and
equip them adequately. Political reformers thus
find themselves charting an increasingly narrow
course between the Scylla of seeking further reduc-
tions in military power and the Charybdis of so
weakening military and security establishments
that they cannot provide the basic physical security
on which the continuing survival of the state
depends.
5 DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OVER MILITARY
AND SECURITY ESTABLISHMENTS:
PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL AND POLICY
CHOICE
Clearly there can be no transition to, still less con-
solidation of, democracy through any of the routes
described earlier, unless military and security
establishments are brought under some kind of
democratic control. Democratic rather than merely
civilian control is emphasized because in Africa as
in Latin America 'without doubt it is easier to
demilitarize the government than the real centres
of power' (Rouquié 1988: 133). As already argued,
some of the civilian-based autocracies now being
urged along the path of democratic reform have
been as repressive and as dependent for survival on
their military and security establishments, as 'mili-
tary' regimes. Nor is it just a question of controlling
the armed forces, since the state's other security
bureaucracies - such as paramilitary or adjunct
forces, the police, intelligence services etc., - are
equally much part of the apparatus of state coercion
and just as badly in need of democratic restraint.
Bringing these military and security establishments
under democratic control requires the solution of
ten interlinked sets of policy or political problems
(in such a political minefield the two cannot be
separated), each of these varying in salience in each
type of transition and national context:
1 The disengagement problem: i.e. how to per-
suade military and security establishments to accept
military retreat from power on a long-term and
unconditional basis. This problem is not as intract-
able as it might seem at first, since neither military
regimes nor the armed forces are as monolithic as
they first appear, especially where they have been
weakened by developmental failure or political
crises. In particular, the military as an institution
does not always support continuation of the mili-
tary as regime: there was, for instance, a strong
military constituency in favour of Nigeria's 1979
56
transition to civilian rule and retired officers remain
prominent in its pro-democracy movement; mili-
tary dissent was crucial in securing the displace-
ment of military governments in Mali and the Congo;
and in Malawí the armed forces played an impor-
tant role in 1994 in blocking efforts by the para-
militaries of the former Banda regime to destabilize
the democratization process. However, in those
cases where the military leadership swings its weight
behind a regime that opposes political change, or
aborts such change because of its own fundamental
mistrust of civilian politicians, as in Nigeria, the
ensuing struggle for democracy will be certainly far
more difficult and protracted.
2 The classic problem of 'civilian control': i.e. how
to prevent military intervention or reintervention
against established democratic institutions. The
standard solution in advanced democracies is
'professionalism' including the doctrine of military
subservience to the civil power as still taught by
Western instructors in African military training
courses. However, not all forms of professionalism,
especially those focusing (as in the most African
armies) on internal security and intra-state conflict,
are equally non-political. Moreover, military
establishments may want to assert their profes-
sional 'autonomy' in order to resist efforts to make
them more democratically accountable; but at the
same time hand be reluctant to relinquish habits of
power acquired during many years of involvement
in politics.
It is arguable that there are useful lessons to be
learnt from the more than a third of African coun-
tries where civilian (if not always democratic)
governments have controlled their armies and been
able to prevent military intervention (Baynham
1992; Decalo 1991). Yet some of their methods - like
incorporating military elites in govemment patron-
age networks, ethnic manipulation or penetration
of the armed forces by state intelligence services -
have damaged the professional competence of the
armed forces. Nor have they necessarily been con-
ducive todemocratic control, especially in the hands
of civilian autocracies in countries like Kenya,
Gabon or Cameroon. In other words there is no
substitute for a revitalized democratic process that
can delegitimize intervention and raise its costs. But
even then, military adventurism remains a real risk.
Hence despite the reservations just expressed, both
reprofessionalization of the armed forces (see 6
below) and dialogue with them about political
and military reform must be amongst the first
priorities of any new democratic government.
However, there is insufficient recognition of the
problems of controlling the armed forces through
the professional model. A case in point is Tanzania,
where the Commission on Multiparty Democracy
recommended the depoliticization of the Tanzanian
Peoples' Defence Force (TPDF) - controlled and
mobilized for development purposes through a close
integration into the party and state machines since
President Nyerere's defence reorganizations in the
1960s - by banning military personnel from party
membership and public office. Reconstitution of
the TPDF as a more politically autonomous entity
will be hard to avoid under multi-party democracy.
Yet it will not necessarily increase its military com-
petence, and could store up political problems for
the future. Not only may Western-style military
professionalism not satisfy military élites in Tanza-
nia (and elsewhere) who still believe they have an
important national political and developmental role.
In a continent where professional interests have
motivated military intervention as frequently as
they have restrained it, professionalism is at best a
shaky foundation for civilian, let alone democratic,
control of the armed forces.
3 The 'democradura' (or 'hard democracy') prob-
1cm: i.e. how to discourage the reinstitutionalization
of authoritarian rule within existing democratic
forms. This depends above all on the capacity of
groups in civil and political society to put continu-
ing and effective pressure on elected governments.
However it also necessitates curbs on the activities of
the state security bureaucracies and intelligence
services, whose covert activities tend to remain rela-
tively intact after transitions, thus tempting new
and insecure governments to use them to monitor
and suppress dissent.
4 The transparency problem: i.e. how to assure the
accountability of the military and security services
and of the elected politicians responsible for them;
such that neither can conceal abuses of power be-
neath the cloak of 'national security'. Secrecy in
military and security matters is endemic even in
advanced democracies. All the more so in the
majority of African states, where it is hard to obtain
even the most basic information, e.g. on military
As became clear in the author's interviews with senior
Ghanaian officers in 1994, who were not only surprisingly open
themselves, but argued for more public debate as a way of gaining
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budgets; where defence and security matters are
scarcely ever debated in the press and parliament;
and where the baneful influence of the security
services on access to information is paramount. A
double-sided approach is needed. On the one hand
governments and military establishments must be
persuaded that excessive secrecy is not necessary
for national security and may even damage it (the
more professional elements in the armed forces may
actually welcome public debate).6 On the other
hand legislators, journalists and members of the
public must be weaned from their mistrust of all
things military; and be persuaded to take a more
informed and active interest in defence and security
matters (e.g. through the establishment of legisla-
tive committees or independent think-tanks and
research bodies).
5 The amnesty for autocrats and warlords di-
lemma: i.e. how to persuade tyrants and their
torturers, enforcers, kieptocrats and placemen to
cede power, whilst satisfying those they have
oppressed that justice is being done, and that the
same injustices will not recur under a new political
dispensation. Both their desire to preserve accumu-
lated power and wealth, and their fear of retribution
strongly motivate autocrats either to frustrate moves
toward democracy, or to coopt them, or at the very
least to pact constitutional dispensations (like the
Transitional Provisions of Ghana's 1992 Constitu-
tion) which protect them from the sort of retribution
being meted out at the time of writing to former
President Banda and his supporters in Malawi. The
best that can be hoped for, at least where autocrats
cannot be directly forced from power, is some
kind of framework to investigate and examine the
lessons of past abuses (the Rettig Commission on
Truth and Reconciliation in Chile could be a model;
such a commission is now proposed in South Africa)
together with strong constitutional protection of
rights and curbs on the security bureaucracies to
prevent their recurrence.
Comparable dilemmas arise in the aftermath of
major armed conflicts, where warlords on one or
both sides have been responsible for large-scale
human, physical and social destruction, as in
Angola, Mozambique or Rwanda. Even if it is not
always feasible to punish the perpetrators, a strong
case can be made for recovering the memory of
public support for military budgets and defence policy and in
order to distance military as an institution from the government of
the day.
what they have done, so as to assist the process of
healing and reconciliation. To be sure, there might
also be a case to be made for forgetting, especially
where largenumbers of the civilian population have
been directly involved in atrocities as in Rwanda, or
where it is politically expedient to persuade former
warlords (like the Renamo leadership in Mozam-
bique) to engage in democratic politics. Yet with-
outany framework of accountability for past abuses,
it will be difficult to formulate and enforce standards
of political conduct that will discourage their
repetition in future.
6 The Hobbesian or command and control prob-
lem: i.e. how to restore discipline in divided,
demoralized military and security bureaucracies,
such that they are capable of maintaining public
order (rather than themselves creating disorder)
and of providing a credible external defence. As
noted earlier, a major legacy of Africa's military
decades has been the deprofessionalization and in
some cases disintegration of the armed forces. Yet
there is also a rather less well publicised history of
reprofessionalization, in most cases so far under
non-democratic leadership7; the reorganization of
the Nigerian armed forces after the 1966 coups and
Civil War, and the restructuring of the Ghanaian
and Ugandan armed forces during the 1980s and
early 1990s being among the more notable exam-
ples. Reprofessionalization has also been the key
to mergers between government and former guer-
rilla forces after colonial wars (as in Zimbabwe,
Namibia and now South Africa, in all three cases
with the aid of British Military Advisory Training
Teams) and after post-colonial civil war as in
Angola, Chad or Mozambique, where the experi-
ence so far has been rather more mixed.
Military restructuring is not easy however. Not
only must it overcome deep-rooted political anta-
gonisms, sometimes between former opponents on
the battlefield. lt will usually require a comprehen-
sive review of the armed forces' role and mission,
doctrine, institutional structures, equipment and
force levels: both to restore their military efficiency;
and because their functions (especially regarding
internal security) are unlikely to be the same under
democratic as authoritarian governance. This will
Though some of the countries that have been most successful
in maintaining relatively professional and effective armed forces
e.g. Senegal and Botswana - have been democracies or quasi-
democracies.
The UNAVEM II operation in Angola was assigned only 450
personnel and a budget of $163 million, a ratio of 1:333 UN
not necessarily come cheap, so that any potential
'democracy dividend' in the form of military
retrenchment may be counterbalanced by the need
to improve the wages, equipment and training of
the troops that remain. It could well require in-
creased external assistance (see 10 below), and, if
it requires large-scale demobilization of military
personnel, give rise to difficult problems of political,
economic and social adjustment for the demobilized
combatants.
7 The demobilization problem: i.e. how to reinte-
grate and cut back swollen, divided and undisci-
plined military and paramilitary forces, including
the growing number of irregular formations. Virtu-
ally all the policy discussion of demobilization
has taken place in the aftermath of major armed
conflicts (i.e. scenarios 5 and 6 above); but very little
thought has been given to it in the context of other
forms of democratic transition, or of military ex-
penditure cuts undertaken as part of structural
adjustment. Demobilization after armed conflict is
usually as much a political as a technical exercise.
Other things being equal, it is far simpler when one
side or the other has won a clear military or political
victory as in Uganda, Ethiopia or Eritrea, than when
the terms and conditions of demobilization have
become part of an ongoing struggle to protect
militarily entrenched positions of power and in-
fluence, as in Angola, Mozambique, Somalia or
Liberia. (Somewhere in between are the cases where
there is military stalemate, but one side concedes
political defeat as in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South
Africa; or where the defeated side has been able tc
regroup and rearm outside the country, as ir
Rwanda).
This being said, a great deal depends on how th
problems of timing, logistics, finance, disarmament
and resettlement of former combatants in civilian
employment are resolved (see the comprehensive
discussion paper on the 'Demobilization and
reintegration of military personnel in Africa' by
the World Bank (1993), the only systematic study of
these problems). For instance, the comprehensive
breakdown of the peace process in Angola in 1992,
despite (relatively speaking) fairly contested elec-
tions, resulted not just from failures of political
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observers to combatants, and a ratio of financial resources of less
than $1,100 per combatant; by comparison in Namibia (a country
with a much smaller population) UNTAG was allocated 8,000
persons and almost $400 million, a ratio of 1:6 observers to com
batants and nearly $7,400 per combatant (World Bank 1993:41).
will on the part of UNITA and other parties to the
process, but also from underfunding of the UN
operation,8 incomplete and poorly planned moni-
toring, encampment and disarmament of the rival
military forces; and failure to complete the latter
before the elections took place, so that the losers had
a strong incentive to take up arms to reverse their
electoral defeat. In contrast, the UN and other actors
in the Mozambique peace process appear to have
learnt from the Angola fiasco, so as to ensure the
(relative) success of both demobilisation exercise
and the 1994 elections. In principle, demobilization
should bring substantial long-term economic ben-
efits relative to its relatively low direct costs9; in
practice the overall peace dividend may be rela-
tively limited (in financial terms), For instance,
Zimbabwe's absorption of at least 55 per cent of the
79,000 former combatants into military and public
service employment helped contain the unrest that
might have arisen had they been put on the street,
but inflated military and public service expendi-
tures for several years after independence.
8 The trade off between military spending and
development: i.e. how to find the resources for
reintegration and reprofessionalization within the
fiscal and balance of payments constraints imposed
by economic adjustment, donor conditionality and
the need to fund development. The issue is both
whether one may look forward to a substantial
democracy or peace dividend from less repressive
governance and/or termination of armed conflict;
and whether increasing donor pressures for mili-
tary cuts in the context of African SAPs can be
satisfied (see Ball 1992 for an excellent review
of problems of 'military conditionality'). A major
obstacle to accurate assessment of the scope for cuts
is the notorious difficulty of estimating military and
security spending (Ball 1994). Furthermore in many
African countries the scope for reductions is in
practice limited by the cuts already forced by fiscal
shrinkage and balance of payment difficulties. In
some of them, as we have seen, the problem is the
reverse, i.e. how to rebuild their armed forces whilst
minimizing the additional costs.
There is most scope for cuts in states where military
spending has been inflated by war (the majority in
the upper part of Tables 3 and 4), provided the
conflicts are in fact terminated. Yet, the problems
The World Bank (1993) finds that in all the African cases it
studied, these were relatively modest, and no more than a small
proportion of official ODA.
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of transforming war-time into peace-time econo-
mies are enormously complex, and may not be
easy to reconcile with pressures for economic
liberalization. Nor will they necessarily permit
rapid reductions in military personnel and expendi-
ture. The current demobilization of 30,000 soldiers
in Uganda, for instance, began in 1992, six years
after the end of the civil war. It is almost unique in
being planned after a public expenditure review, in
association with the country's SAP, following a
degree of donor pressure for military cuts. It also
helps that donors have been prepared to come up
with compensatory finance for demobilized sol-
diers, and that the military establishment itself
favours a smaller, more effective, better trained and
equipped force (though military pressures for re-
equipment could limit the financial impact of
downsizing). A comparable exercise carried out in
Chad during 1992/3 after French and IMF/ World
Bank pressure for military retrenchment, merely
resulted in demobilized soldiers decamping with
their weapons to join the numerous independent
militias, due to poor organization and the Déby
government's lack of serious commitment to either
economic or political reform.
9 The regional security problem: i.e. how to create
a regional framework for peace-keeping, to support
efforts to bring national military and security estab-
lishments under democratic control, and at the
same time prevent conflicts from spreading across
national boundaries and attracting external and
regional intervention. There is a long history of
involvement both by foreign powers and by re-
gional neighbours in armed conflicts within African
states, dating back to the Congo crisis in the early
1960s. Often such conflicts have served to entrench
authoritarian regimes, such as the military govern-
ment in the Sudan and former military government
of Ethiopia, reinforced in their unwillingness to
resolve conflicts peacefully by their access to exter-
nal military support. (Rebel groups, too, have often
received sustenance from neighbouring states or
international supporters). In principle it is best for
African conflicts to be resolved at a regional level,
and African governments have a long history of
participation in conflict-resolution and peace-
keeping efforts, both under the UN and through
the OAU and sub-regional bodies like ECOWAS.
But in practice these efforts, such as the ECOMOG
force in Liberia have run into many of the same
difficulties as the growing number of international
'humanitarian' interventions. At the nub of these
difficulties and of the solutions to them is the ques-
tion of democracy: how to install governments
(preferably through free elections held in con-
junction with a conflict - resolution process) that
command the broad assent of previously alienated
and disenfranchised citizens; whilst recognizing
the fears and aspirations of minorities which have
often been at the root of conflict; and at the same
time forcing warlords and military entrepreneurs
into submission, or offering them adequate incen-
tives to desist (not easy because it is precisely through
warfare and their control of men and weapons that
they survive and accumulate power and profit).
10 The dependency (or external accountability)
dilemma: i.e. how the international community and
foreign powers can assist democratization and de-
militarization without further undermining African
states, e.g. through heavy handed economic and
political conditionality, partisan military interven-
tion (even if it is under 'humanitarian' auspices as in
Somalia or Rwanda) or imposition of inappropriate
models of democracy or military professionalism.
The donors are already deeply and irreversibly in-
volved: indirectly through the political impact of
economic reforms (including SAPs); directly through
political (and military) conditionality under which
aid is linked to progress on political reforms and
military cuts; more directly still through their par-
ticipation in peace-keeping, support for military
demobilization, and assistance in the monitoring
of elections etc.
The specific issue for consideration here is how far
it is desirable or indeed feasible for them to push for
° The IMF and World Bank first broached the question of excessive
military spending in 1989; the former gave its staff a mandate to
include military expenditure in their Article IV consultations with
donors in 1981; some bilateral donors have gone much further in
proposing specific targets for military expenditure reduction (Ball
1992).
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